William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 13 | Issue 2

Article 5

1987

Tort "Reform": Minnesota Does Not Need
Legislation That Makes Victims Pay for the
Negligence of Others
David J. Moskal
Peter H. Berge

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Moskal, David J. and Berge, Peter H. (1987) "Tort "Reform": Minnesota Does Not Need Legislation That Makes Victims Pay for the
Negligence of Others," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 13: Iss. 2, Article 5.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Moskal and Berge: Tort "Reform": Minnesota Does Not Need Legislation That Makes Vic

TORT "REFORM": MINNESOTA DOES NOT NEED
LEGISLATION THAT MAKES VICTIMS PAY
FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF OTHERS
DAVID

PETER

J.

MOSKALt

H.

BERGEJ

INTRODUCTION ..........................................

I.

THE CIVIL LIABILITY SYSTEM HAS NOT CAUSED THE

C RISIS ..............................................
A. Society is not "Sue Happy" . .....................
B. Jury Awards Are Not Excessive ....................
C. The Insurance Industry is Healthy ................
II.

349
350
353

354

PAST TORT REFORM HAS NOT LOWERED INSURANCE

RATES .............................................

IV.

349

THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY ITSELF Is THE CAUSE OF

T HE CRISIS .........................................

III.

347

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS .................

A.

Equal Protection ..............
..............
1. Limiting Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees .............
2. Caps on Damages ............................
B. Due Process ....................................
C. Other Constitutional Concerns ....................
CONCLUSION ............................................

356
358
358
360
361
362
363

365

INTRODUCTION

"A crisis can be a truly marvelous mechanism for the withdrawal or suspension of established rights. . .. "I
t Mr. Moskal is an associate practicing with the firm of Schwebel, Goetz &
Sieben, P.A. He received his undergraduate degree with highest honors from De
Paul University. Mr. Moskal received his J.D. degree magna cum laude from William
Mitchell College of Law, where he graduated first in his class and served as an editor
on the law review.
I Mr. Berge is an associate with the law firm of Schwebel, Goetz & Sieben, P.A.,
where he specializes in motion practice and appeals. A cum laude graduate of William Mitchell College of Law, Mr. Berge is a former editor of the William Mitchell
Law Review.
1. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 168, 695 P.2d 665, 687,
211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 390 (1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (quoted in Jenkins &
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The year 1986 witnessed, in what has become a decennial
event, yet another "insurance crisis." Minnesota felt the effects along with the rest of the country:
It nearly snuffed out the Ice Palace, and it plagues day care
centers, cities, professionals and businesses of all stripes:
the liability insurance crisis. Insurance rates have skyrocketed, shooting out of reach for some people. For some activities, insurance has vanished at any price. The crisis is
causing drastic trouble for many, so many are calling for
drastic measures to combat it... 2
Just what measures should be taken has been a matter of split
opinion: the insurance lobby calling for "tort reform," consumer advocates and trial attorneys calling for "insurance
reform."
Solomonically, the 1986 Minnesota Legislature enacted legislation encompassing both "tort reform" and some elements
of "insurance reform." 3 The exact nature of that legislation
and its impact upon tort law and trial practice has been examined elsewhere. 4 The authors intend this Article to address
the question of whether additional changes in the civil liability
system are needed.
No doubt, our civil liability system is not perfect. Before
contemplating any remedy, however, a firm understanding of
the nature of the malady and its probable responses to treatment is axiomatic. To that end, this Article examines whether
there is an "insurance crisis," 5 whether the insurance industry's financial woes are actually the result of a "litigation explosion" or merely the result of the industry's business practices, 6
whether the changes proposed will actually have their proposed
effects, 7 and whether proposed changes are
8
constitutional.
Schweinfurth, California's Medical Injury Compensaiton Reform Act: An Equal Protection
Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829, 935 (1979)).

2. St. Paul Pioneer Press, Mar. 2, 1986, at 2H, col. 1.
3. Act of March 25, 1986, ch. 455, §§ 1-95, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 840-86.
4. See generally Note, Introduction to Minnesota's Tort Reform Act, 13 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 277 (1987).

5.
6.
7.
8.

See
See
See
See

infra note 9 and accompanying text.
infra notes 10-49 and accompanying text.
infra notes 50-67 and accompanying text.
infra notes 68-102 and accompanying text.
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I.

THE CIVIL LIABILITY SYSTEM HAS NOT CAUSED THE CRISIS

No doubt there has been a crisis in the availability and cost
of liability insurance. In a well orchestrated and heavily financed campaign, the insurance industry has cast blame on the
civil liability system and plaintiff's trial lawyers for the crisis.
The campaign claims that Americans are "sue happy," that
jury awards are excessive and that, as a result, the insurance
industry is in dire financial straights. Is this so, or is the crisis,
as Consumer Reports found it, "A Manufactured Crisis?" 9
A.

Society is Not "Sue Happy"

Proponents of tort reform argue that our courthouses are
literally exploding with new lawsuits filed by malingering plaintiffs and their money-grubbing attorneys. This is a myth.
The myth is fostered by frequent reference to the February,
1986 Justice Department Report discussing the availability and
affordability of liability insurance.' 0 The Justice Department
Report states that there is a significant increase in the frequency of litigation. The assertion is based only on data indicating that product liability case filings in federal district courts
had increased 758%, from 1,579 in 1974 to 13,554 in 1985."
With no sound basis to arrive at such a conclusion, the report
concludes that "[t]here is no reason to believe that the states
(sic) courts have not witnessed a simliar dramatic increase in
2
the number of product liablity claims."'
Data from state courts indicate otherwise. A recent study by
the National Center for State Courts indicates that the number
of tort claims filed in state courts increased only nine percent
from 1978 to 1984.13 That increase is likely attributable al9. The Manufactured Crisis: Liability-Insurance Companies Have Created A Crisis and
Dumped It on You, CONSUMER REPORTS 541, 544 (August 1986) [hereinafter Manufactured Crisis].
10. Justice Department, Report of the Tort Policy Vorking Group on the Causes, Extent
and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability (Feb.
1986) [hereinafter Justice Department Report] (Copy on file at the William Mitchell
Law Review Office).
11. Id. at 45.
12. Id.
13. See COURT STATISTICS AND INFOR. MGMT. PROJECT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE

COURTS,

A

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF AVAILABLE

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL

TREND DATA IN STATE TRIAL COURTS FOR 1978, 1981 AND 1984, at 2 (April, 1986)
(study limited to county courts) [hereinafter Court Statistics Project] (Copy on file at
the William Mitchell Law Review Office).
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most entirely to an increase in population of eight percent over
that same time period.' 4 In Minnesota, there was actually a
twenty-three percent decrease in tort, contract, and real property disputes filed during that time period.' 5 While the study
does not measure federal litigation, any increases in the federal
system are relative trifles since state court litigation accounts
16
for ninety-eight percent of all litigation in this country.
The statistics from the state court administrator's office in
Minnesota show no great increase in the number of personal
injury filings. Indeed, the figures reflect a decrease in the per17
centage of personal injury filings as against other civil filings.
In 1981, 3,936 personal injury filings represented 38.8% of
the total filings;' 8 in 1983, 4,626 personal injury filings represented 21.6% of all filings; 19 and, in 1985, 5,410 personal injury filings represented only 18.1% of all civil filings. 20
Considering that the population of the state grew during that
time period, neither the numbers nor the percentage should
raise any concerns about a tort litigation explosion in this
state.
Americans in general, and Minnesotans in particular, are not
the least "sue happy." 2 1 There is no litigation explosion. The
high cost and unavailability of liability insurance in 1986 cannot, therefore, be attributed to increased litigation.
B. Jury Awards Are Not Excessive
"THE LAWSUIT CRISIS IS BAD FOR BABIES"; "THE
LAWSUIT CRISIS IS PENALIZING SCHOOL SPORTS";
"INSURANCE IS GETTING KILLED IN SELF-DEFENSE." 2 2
These are the headlines of insurance industry advertising. All
are meant to get at the same idea: juries are out of control,
14. Id. at 2, Tables 32 and 34.
15. Id., Table 32.
16. See Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinar, Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 81 n.21 (1983).
17. See generally Appendix.
18. Id., Table 13.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don t Know
(And Think 11e Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV.

4, 69 (1983).

22. Manufactured Crisis, supra note 9, at 545.
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awarding millions of dollars to the undeserving uninjured.
This too is a myth.
Insurance company lobbyists will likely rely on the previously mentioned Justice Department Report which adopts the
statistics and findings of a private research group: Jury Verdict
Research. 23 The report found jury verdicts excessive because
"between 1975 and 1985 the average medical malpractice jury
verdict increased from $220,018 to $1,017,716, and the average product liability jury verdict increased from $393,580 to
$1,850,452."24
"The Jury Verdict Research statistics," writes Consumer Reports, "don't reflect reality very well." 2 5 Only initial jury verdicts are recorded. Even the Justice Department Report
admits that the Jury Verdict Research data "is incomplete and
is subject to refinement .... The reported average annual verdicts are not used by the Working Group as an accurate state26
ment ...of the average jury verdict in any particular year."
No allowance is made for remittitur, post trial settlements, reduction to present value of future damages, directed verdicts,
new trials, or verdicts overturned upon appeal. Only plaintiffs'
verdicts are included, defense verdicts are not. No accounting
of pre-trial settlements is attempted; pre-trial settlements account for ninety to ninety-five percent of all tort cases. 27 Pretrial settlements are generally smaller than actual jury verdicts. 28 The data is incomplete and inaccurate. The average
award to an injured person is significantly lower than the statistics published in the Justice Department Report indicate.
To compound the error, the Jury Verdict Research statistics
are presented in a manner which skews the results. By presenting the statistics on the basis of average awards, the results are
susceptible to being skewed by a single large recovery. Use of
the median award is a much better way to determine the average injured person's award. For example, the average recorded verdict in Cook County, Illinois in 1983 was
23. See generally Justice Department Report, supra note 10.
24. Id. at 2-3.
25. Manufactured Crisis, supra note 9, at 544.

26. Justice Department Report, supra note 10, at 35-36 n.33.
27. See Galanter, supra note 21, at 26-28; Trubek & Sarat, supra note 16, at 89.
28.

DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE THEORY,

EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY

31

(1985).
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That certainly was not what the average injured

person received, for nearly ninety percent of reported verdicts
were lower. 30 The median award was only $8,800. 3 1 The
Rand Corporation found, in its study of Cook County verdicts,
that jury verdicts increased no more than the rate of inflation
and that, in at least half of all jury awards, only "small"
amounts of money are awarded. 32 The Jury Verdict Research
study starts with biased assumptions, relies on incomplete and
unreliable data, and thereby comes to erroneous conclusions.
Statistics in Minnesota do not bear out any significant increase, even in average jury verdicts. For example, in Hennepin County in 1981 the average jury verdict was $17,153.86.33
Seventy-four percent of all verdicts were lower than the aver-

age. 34 In 1982, the average jury verdict dipped to $14,063.30

with 78.6% of all verdicts lower than the average.35 The average verdict rose in 1983 to $19,049.12, but 83.7% of the verdicts reached were below that amount. 36 Average verdicts for
1984 took a nose dive to $13,682.72 with 79.8% of all verdicts
being lower.3 7 In 1985, the average jury verdict was
$16,003.57 with 77.1% of all verdicts below that average. 38
Similar statistics are seen in other Minnesota counties.3 9
Juries are not awarding exorbitant verdicts. As the Consumer Federation of America reported, "Rather than running
wild, as the Reagan Administration alleges, American juries
are demonstrating the common sense of the American public
... ."40 During the last decade, juries have increased awards
29. See DANIELS, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STORM ON THE HORIZON?, PRELIMINARY
REPORT OF THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES PROJECT 13 (1986) [hereinafter DANIELS]. See also
RAND CORP., THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST SIX PROGRAM YEARS 24-34 (1986) (citing to PETERSON & PRIEST, THE CIVILJURY: TRENDS IN
TRIALS AND VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960-1979 (1982)) (Copy on file at
the William Mitchell Law Review Office).

30. DANIELS, supra note 29, at 13.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Appendix, Table 3.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., Tables 7, 11 and 15.

CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, PRODUCT LIABILITY JURY AWARDS REFLECT COMMON SENSE OF AMERICAN PEOPLE 1 (May 30, 1986) (Copy on file at the

William Mitchell Law Review Office).
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by no more than the value of changing economic and social
conditions. For example, during the last decade alone, inflation increased by eighty-three percent and medical costs increased at least twenty-three percent beyond the general
inflation rate. 4 ' Jury verdicts rising in line with inflation could
not have caused the skyrocketing costs and unavailability of liability insurance.
C.

The Insurance Industry is Healthy

The insurance industry claims that the business of insurance
has become unprofitable because of the "tort crisis." This is
the most pernicious of all the myths.
The insurance industry is presently profitable. While one industry advertisement stated that $116 was paid out for every
$100 of premium taken in,42 that is a deceptive accounting. It
fails to take into account the $121 billion earned from investments. It also ignores the industry's favorable tax standing,
which allowed many of its most profitable companies to evade
paying taxes altogether. 4 3 Between 1975 and 1984, the industry's assets more than tripled to $265 billion. 4 4 Its surpluses
are at record levels of nearly sixty-four billion dollars. 45 The
Justice Department Report concedes that "the [insurance] in41. Id. at 2.
42. THE MINNESOTA

TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, SELECTED SHORT READINGS ON
THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INSURANCE SCANDAL 20 (1986) (Copy on file at

the William Mitchell Law Review Office).
43. See ManufacturedCrisis, supra note 9, at 547.
The mechanics of the insurance companies' tax dodge are that when any claim is
made, the company may estimate what the ultimate payment will be and set that
money aside as a "loss reserve." Although the claim will not be paid out for years,
for tax purposes, that money can be deducted as a loss. It would be unrealistic to
assume that the amount reserved is often underestimated, since that amount is left to
the judgment of the insurance company. As Natwar M. Gandhi of the U.S. General
Accounting Office said:
As a result of certain tax advantages, many property/casualty companies
have not paid federal income taxes for a number of years and, in fact, have
qualified for refunds. While property and casualty companies had about
$46-billion in underwriting losses from 1975 through 1984, they had about
$121 -billion in investment gains during this period, resulting in a net gain of
about $75-billion for those years. From 1975 through 1984, federal income
taxes were a negative $125-million, a rate of minus 0.2 percent of the net
gain.
Id. Recent changes in the tax law will have little effect on insurance companies.
44. Justice Department Report, supra note 10, at 18.
45. Id.
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dustry is currently making a profit ... "46
No end in the industry's profit-making trend is foreseen.
The federal government's General Accounting Office (GAO)
expects that the industry will record profits of ninety billion
dollars from 1986 to 1990. 4 7 Wall Street is similarly bullish on

the insurance industry's long-term profitability. The Salomon
Brothers brokerage house forecasts that the property/casualty
industry will see profits increase twenty-five percent over the
48
next five years.

Not surprisingly, the value of stock in insurance companies
has skyrocketed dramatically during the last two years. In fact,
insurance stocks in 1985 rose in value by fifty percent, approximately twice the DowJones industrial average increase. 49 During the last decade, the property/casualty insurance stock
index has risen more than 500%, five times the rise of the Dow
Jones average. 50 Over the last sixteen years, the property/casualty index is the "growth leader with [a growth rate
of] 524 percent." 5'
If this is a picture of an industry in crisis, it is a crisis the steel
and shoe industries can only wish to have visited upon them.
If no other statistic shows the manufactured character of this
"crisis," the past, present, and future profitability of the insurance industry does. This "growth leader" industry needs no
more financial help from its state's legislature or its citizens.
II.

THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY ITSELF
CAUSE OF THE CRISIS

Is

THE

The fact that the civil liability system has not caused the crisis in affordability and availability of liability insurance does
46. Id.
47. NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF ATTrORNEYS GENERAL, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES

OF THE CURRENT CRISIS OF UNAVAILABILITY AND UNAFFORDABILITY OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 17 (May 1986) [hereinafter ATTORNEYS GENERAL] (citing Profitability of the Property/Casualty Insurance Industry: Hearings Before The Subcomm. on Oversight, House Comm. on

Ways and Means, (May 3, 1986) (Statement of Johnny C. Finch, Senior Associate Director, Gen. Gov. Div., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office)) [hereinafter Finch Statement]
(Copy on file at the William Mitchell Law Review Office).
48. Id. (citing SALOMON BROTHERS, INC., PROPERTY/CASUALTY INS. ORG., FIVEYEAR REVIEW AND OUTLOOK, 1985 Edition (Aug. 1985)).
49. King, 1985 Insurance Stock Trends, BEST'S REVIEW, PROPERTY/CASUALTY INS.
ED., 21 (Feb. 1986).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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not answer the question of where the cause in fact lies. By process of elimination only one party is left: the insurance industry itself. The industry's own business practices are, in fact, the
cause of the crisis.
The insurance industry is cyclical. During the late 1970's
and the early 1980's interest rates were on the rise, peaking
near twenty-two percent. In an "attempt to generate cash flow
for investments, insurers competed aggressively for premium
dollars, knocking prices more and more out of line with actual
costs." 5 2 In order to attract customers and gain policy dollars
to invest, the insurers undervalued risks, assuming the difference could be made up from investments. 53 Since 1983, interest rates have precipitously dropped to unexpected lows at the
same time that the risky policies written by the companies are
coming due.
Although premiums were priced adequately to pay for losses
during the period of high interest rates, those premiums are
presently inadequate to pay for losses at a time of declining
interest rates. The present premium increases and the unavailability of insurance for some activities are brought about by the
need to make up for the drastic drop in interest income suffered by the insurance industry. It is an injustice to blame the
crisis on the civil litigation system; the insurance industry itself
is responsible for the insurance premium explosion.
52. See INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, 1985, A CRITICAL YEAR (May 1985) [hereinafter CRITICAL YEAR].
53. Even the Justice Department Report acknowledges the cyclical nature of the
insurance industry and the aggressive competition for premium dollars:
For the better part of seven years, the insurance industry has been engaged
in a brutal price war. During the early 1980's, the price for commercial insurance was decreasing, sometimes sharply, as insurers vied for premium
dollars to invest at the high interest rates then in effect ....
See Justice Department Report, supra note 10, at 22 (quoting ISO, FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY-AN UPDATE (1985)). The nonpartisan GAO noted

that the industry's "strategy has been to sacrifice underwriting gains for investment
gains." Finch Statement, supra note 47, at 3. BUSINESS WEEK states that "[tihe rate
hikes... result largely from the insurance industry's own mismanagement." Glaberson & Farrell, Commentary, BUSINESS WEEK, 24 (April 21, 1986). Even some members
of the insurance industry admit that "[p]ricing had failed to keep pace with loss costs
and lag in the nation's overall economic growth has brought insurers into their current predicament." See CRITICAL YEAR, supra note 52, at 6.
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PAST TORT REFORM HAS NOT LOWERED
INSURANCE RATES

The civil justice system is not the cause of the unaffordability
and unavailability of liability insurance. This is best exemplified by the inability of past tort reform efforts to control the
rising cost and availability of insurance. In the mid-1970's, a
similar "crisis" occurred in the insurance industry. During the
"crisis," the insurance industry argued that changes in the civil
justice system would alleviate the problem. Several states were
convinced to enact tort reform legislation.
The Iowa Legislature, for example, made changes in its statute of limitations, 54 the collateral source rule, 55 and abolished
joint and several liability 56 in response to the proffered crisis.
Former Iowa Senate Majority Leader Lowell Junkins testified
that those legislative changes were made:
under the instructions that if [Iowa] were to do so, the court
system would clear up, the claims would be fewer, the deeppocket theory would no longer affect us ....
We were told that we needed to change the joint and several liability statute in our state in order to provide for,
number 1, affordable insurance, and number 2, available in57
surance in the cases where it was unavailable.
Nonetheless, in 1986, forty-one counties in Iowa were notified
that their liability coverage would be cancelled within thirty
days, and many later obtained coverage by paying premium increases of up to 1,000%. 5 8 SenatorJunkins conluded that "no
benefits" came from changes made in the tort system, and
warned other states not to engage in "herd mentality" by making radical changes in their tort law without full facts as to the
59
real causes and possible solutions to the problem.
54. The 1975 amendment provided a separate period for commencement of
medical malpractice suits. Prior to 1975, all tort claims were subject to a two-year
limitation for filing after the cause of action accrued. IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1(3)
(West 1975). Subsequent to 1975, medical malpractice actions were subject to the
additional limitation that in "no event" may the action commence more than six
years from the date the act occurred. IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1(9) (West Supp. 1986).
55. IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.136 (West Supp. 1986).
56. IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.3 (repealed by Act of May 17, 1984, ch. 1293, § 12,
1984 Iowa Acts 524, 526).
57. ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 47, at 40 (citing TEXAs JOINT SENATE AND
HOUSE COMMITTEE TO STUDY LIABILITY INSURANCE 3 (Feb. 8, 1986) (testimony of
Lowell L. Junkins, Former Senate Majority Leader for the State of Iowa)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 41.
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A 1985 study of medical malpractice insurance funded by
the U.S. Healthcare Financing Administration found that tort
reform had little effect on medical malpractice rates:
Almost all states enacted legislation in response to the rapid
rise in malpractice insurance premiums which occurred during the mid-1970's .... The empirical results of the study

presented here give no indication that individual state legislative actions, or actions taken collectively, had their in60
tended effects on premiums.
By far the best demonstration of the ineffectiveness of past
tort reform is the experience of Ontario, Canada. Ontario tort
laws are an insurance company's idea of nirvana. Damages are
caped at $100,000 in 1978 Canadian dollars; 6' punitive damages are unknown save for intentional torts;6 2 contingency
fees are prohibited; 63 judges, rather than juries, sit as finders of
both fact and law; 64 and, in the event that the plaintiff does not
prevail, he must pay the defendant's attorney fees as well as his
own. 6 5 Nonetheless, Ontario faces the same insurance
problems that Minnesota faces. Day care centers, 66 municipalities, 6 7 school boards, 68 hospitals, 69 and even the Candian Na60. See Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice Insurance "Crisis" of the 1970's: An
EmpiricalAssessment, 9 J. HEALTH POLrICS, POLICY & L., 629, 629 (1985).
61.

ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION,

REPORT ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 62

(1979) [hereinafter ONTARIO LAw REFORM]; See also Andrews v. Grand and Toy Alberta Ltd., 2 S.C.R. 229 (1978).
62.

ONTARIO LAW REFORM, supra note 61, at 75; See LINDEN, CANADIAN TORT LAw

49-51 (1977).
63. ONTARIO LAw REFORM, supra note 61, at 72, 75.
64. Id. at 74, 102-04.
65. Id. at 72, 76.
66. Liability coverage crunch may shut day-care agencies, Toronto Star, Jan. 10, 1986, at
-, col. -.
(Copy on file at the William Mitchell Law Review Office). The article
recounts how several day care centers could not find insurance at any price:
Family Day Care, one of the oldest registered charities in Canada, has
been in operation for 135 years and has never had an insurance claim, [its
director] said. Its premiums rose 65 percent last year to about $2,500 but
this year the insurer refused to renew the policy.
"At this point we are willing to pay 1,000 per cent more if necessary,
but we can't even get a quote," he said.
Id.
67. 'Crisis'team to investigate soaringprice of insurance, Toronto Star, Jan. 10, 1986, at
-,
col. -. (Copy on file at the William Mitchell Law Review Office). The article
details the financial crisis faced by Ontario cities, school boards, and hospitals because of rising insurance prices. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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tional Ski Team 70 found renewing their insurance policies
exorbitantly expensive if they could find insurance at all. 7'

Having had so little effect in the past, it is difficult to see how
similar tort reform will be effective in the future.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Despite the fact that there has been no litigation explosion
in Minnesota, and despite the fact that juries have not been
overly generous in their awards, the insurance industry is still
likely to come to future legislatures with proposals for tort reform. Such reform will not be effective, and for that reason
alone should not be enacted. Grave questions concerning the
constitutionality of these proposals also advise caution before
action is taken on further tort reform. While it is beyond the
scope of this Article to definitively explore all possible constitutional infirmities of the proposed legislation, an overview is
in order. In particular, proposals to limit plaintiffs' attorneys'
fees and cap damage awards should give the legislature pause,
for they violate the fundamental tenants of both our state and
federal constitutions.
A.

Equal Protection

Both the Minnesota and U.S. Constitutions require equal
protection of the laws. 72 In the words of the U.S. Constitution,
"No State shall . . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction

the equal protection of the laws." 73 While not demanding absolute equality, equal protection demands that those similarly
situated be treated similarly.7 4 Its purpose is to "secure to
every person the right to be free from arbitrary and intentional
discrimination. "75
Three basic tests have evolved for evaluating equal protec70. Insurance problems may curtail season for canadian skiiers, Globe Mail, Jan. 15,
1986, at -, col. Al. (Copy on file at the William Mitchell Law Review Office.) Inability to get sufficient liability insurance threatened to force the Canadian National Ski
Team to leave the World Cup circuit and "cripple competitive skiing across Canada."
Id.
71. Id.
72. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl.2; MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl.2.
74. See Kossak v, Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn. 1979); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 343-44 (1949).

75. Price v. Amdal, 256 N.W.2d 461, 468 (Minn. 1977).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss2/5

12

Moskal and Berge: Tort "Reform": Minnesota Does Not Need Legislation That Makes Vic
1987]

TORT REFORM

tion challenges. When dealing with a suspect classification,
such as race or religion, 76 or a fundamental interest, such as
privacy or voting rights, 77 strict scrutiny is generally required:
the classification must be necessary to promote a compelling
state interest. 78 For some suspect classifications, such as gender classifications, and some important but not fundamental
interests, an intermediate standard of review has evolved: the
law must serve an important government interest, and the classification must be substantially related to that interest. 79 Finally, in all other instances, the legislation need only be
80
rationally related to a legitimate public purpose.
Which standard of review is appropriate depends upon the
societal position of those classified or the importance of the
rights involved. The rights impinged upon by tort reform legislation-the right to redress grievances, the right to trial by
jury-are very important rights, although not fundamental
rights. The intermediate standard of review is appropriate for
the paralytics, amputees, and brain injured who are the targets
of this tort reform. They are a discrete and insular group without political muscle in much the same way as are victims of
gender classifications.
During the last insurance crisis of the mid-1970's, the target
76. E.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
77. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting rights); Griswold v.

Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraceptive information).
78. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
79. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971). But c.f Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974). In both
Schlesinger and Kahn, the intermediate standard was used to uphold remedial legislation.

The intermediate standard is "poised between the largely toothless invocation of
minimum rationality and the nearly fatal invocation of strict scruntiny." L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 16-30, at 1082 (1978). The process is two-tiered:
Under these standards, courts must initially determine if a reasonably conceivable legislative purpose exists that supports the challenged classification. If the requisite purpose or state interest is lacking, further inquiry is
unnecessary because the law fails even under the minimum standard of review-mere rationality. But if a rational government interest can be reasonably imagined or is supplied by the legislation itself, the courts must then
engage in further analysis to determine whether the classification operates
in an acceptable manner. Thus, this process involves examination of the
legislative means, as well as the asserted or postulated ends of the statute to
which the means are directed.
Note, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge,
52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829, 898-99 (1979) [hereinafter MICRA and Equal Protection].

80. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
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was medical malpractice insurance. Many states passed legislation capping damages and limiting attorneys' fees for medical
malpractice cases. A number of states found those tort reforms violative of the guarantees of equal protection using the
8
intermediate standard of review. '
1.

Limiting Plaintifs' Attorneys' Fees

Limiting plaintiffs' attorneys' fees creates distinctly separate
classifications between injured plaintiffs and insurance companies. 8 2 The proposed attorneys' fee limitations are directed
only to plaintiffs' attorneys. The impact is absorbed primarily
by the poor, who are financially unable to hire counsel absent a
contingent fee arrangement. Insurance companies, however,
are left a free hand. Since the insurance company does not pay
the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, how this classification is even rationally related to lowering insurance rates is a mystery. Juries
are not presented with and cannot take into account the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. Settlement negotiations are always based
upon the likely result of a jury verdict. Legal fees paid to the
plaintiff's attorney, therefore, do not increase the size of settle81. See Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 871, 555 P.2d 399, 411
(1976) (a case challenging statutory limitations on the collateral source rule and a
$150,000 cap on damages was remanded to the trial court for a determination of
whether "the statute reflect[ed] any reasonably conceived public purpose, and
[whether] the establishment of the classification [had] a fair and substantial relation
to the achievement of the objective and purpose .... "); Wright v. Central Du Page
Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) ($500,000 cap on damages in
medical malpractice cases held unconstitutional as "arbitrary " utilizing the rational
basis test; the court indicated that an intermediate standard should be applied); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (a medical malpractice damages
cap held to violate equal protection utilizing a heightened scrutiny standard); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) (limitations on collateral source rule and a
$300,000 cap on damages held unconstitutional for failing to effectuate the legislative purpose of lowering insurance rates); Graley v. Sataytham, 74 Ohio Op. 3d 316,
343 N.E.2d 832 (1976); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355
N.E.2d 903 (1976) (limitations on collateral source rule and $200,000 cap found unconstitutional); Oregon Medical Ass'n v. Rawls, 276 Or. 1101, 557 P.2d 664 (1976)
(equal protection challenge to damages cap; the case was remanded for a determination of constitutionality under the intermediate standard of review). But see, e.g., Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977).
82. The majority of personal injury litigation is in practical effect a dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant's insurance carrier. Minnesota does not have a
direct action statute. A direct action statute would allow a plaintiff to commence an
action directly against the defendant's insurance carrier, thereby decreasing transaction costs.
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ments or verdicts any more than brokers' commissions affect
the price of stock.
There is only one argument that supports the position that
placing a limit on plaintiffs' attorneys' fees will decrease insurance company payouts. According to that argument, by making it unprofitable to represent plaintiffs, the best and the
brightest plaintiffs' lawyers will go to a more lucrative area of
practice. Those attorneys left, therefore, will have diminished
resources with which to represent their clients. Creating a disincentive to one class of persons to fully litigate cases is not a
permissible means of achieving the goal of lowering insurance
rates. Limiting attorneys' fees bears no rational relationship to
its proffered goal, nor does it substantially serve to accomplish
that goal. It is, therefore, unconstitutional as a violation of
83
equal protection.
2.

Caps on Damages

A cap on damages affects only the most severely injured of
plaintiffs: the paralytics, the amputees, and the brain injured.
Capping damages delineates a class of severely injured persons. These severely injured are denied full compensation for
their injuries, whereas the class of less severely injured can obtain full compensation for theirs. Patent injustice aside, this is
the kind of arbitrary classification that the Minnesota Supreme
Court has, in the past, struck down as violative of equal
protection.8 4
For example, the Municipal Tort Claims Act provided that
all could sue a municipality in tort except those who are covered by workers' compensation.8 5 The Minnesota Supreme
Court, in Bernthal v. City of St. Paul,8 6 found the classification
arbitrary and struck it down as a violation of equal protection.8 7 The court found no more justification for denial of the
right to litigate a claim based upon insurance status than if the
classification had been made on a gender basis.8 8 The court
concluded that "the classification serves to reduce the number
83. See MICRA and Equal Protection, supra note 79, at 941-47.
84. See Price, 256 N.W.2d at 469. The purpose of equal protection is to secure
"the right to be free from arbitrary and intentional discrimination." Id.
85. MINN. STAT. § 466.03, subd. 2 (1984).
86. 376 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1985).
87. Id. at 426.
88. Id.
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of suits possible against a municipality on a basis completely
89
unrelated to the purpose of the statute."
The proposed cap on damages prevents the most severely
injured of plaintiffs from being fully compensated. These
plaintiffs are denied full compensation because their injuries
are grave and their damages are correspondingly high. There
is no more logic in denying the paralytic the right to fully litigate his claim than there is in denying red haired women the
right to fully litigate their claims. The caps are an arbitrary
classification unrelated to the purpose of tort reform. They
are, therefore, unconstitutional deprivations of the right to
equal protection under the laws. 90
B.

Due Process

The Bill of Rights and the 14th amendment guarantee due
process of law and the right to "petition the Government for a
redress of grievances in the state courts." 9' Due process guarantees a right to a hearing even in civil cases. 92 A right to a
hearing is guaranteed before termination of government entitlements, 9 3 before having one's name posted as an excessive
drinker, 94 and before prejudgment attachment can be had by
creditors. 95 It is axiomatic that such a hearing must be complete to deal with the rights involved.
The proposals to limit plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and cap
damages seek to lower insurance rates by limiting individuals'
rights to seek redress in the courts. If due process guarantees
the right to a complete hearing before termination of welfare
benefits or posting of one's name as a drunkard, it also protects the right of every individual to hire counsel as they see fit
and to present their full case at trial. The proposed "reforms,"
which threaten these rights, are violative of the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law.
89. Id. See also Glassman v. Miller, 356 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1984) (notice of claim
provision violates equal protection); Kossak v. Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1979)
(statute of limitations violates equal protection).
90. See MICRA and Equal Protection, supra note 79, at 951-55.
91. U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, XIV.

92. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (right to hearing before revocation of
driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (right to a hearing before
termination of government entitlements).
93. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261.
94. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
95. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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As seen above, the only way that limiting plaintiffs' attorneys' fees will affect insurance rates is by causing a market dislocation whereby the best attorneys seek a different area of
practice, and by limiting the plaintiff's financial resources for
litigation. 96 Both are violations of the plaintiff's right to due
process.
Whether by market dislocation or by limiting the financial
resources of plaintiffs, an attorneys' fees limitation which applies only to plaintiffs' lawyers places plaintiffs at an unfair disadvantage to insurance companies. By cutting the profitability
of plaintiffs' practice, it is only natural that many of the best
attorneys will begin to concentrate on other, more profitable
areas of law. The practice of insurance defense law would remain profitable and continue to be directly reflected in the cost
of insurance premiums. 9 7 The best insurance defense lawyers
will continue to practice insurance defense law. The effect of
the proposal is, therefore, to deny plaintiffs their right to counsel of their choice. A legislated limit on plaintiffs' attorneys'
fees violates due process.
Even more acutely and immediately, limiting attorneys' fees
limits the amount of legal resources with which the plaintiffs
can pursue their claims. At the same time, insurance companies have no such limits. They have all the resouces of a multibillion dollar corporate industry behind them. Even now, the
confrontation is something like David meeting Goliath. To
then expect David to go into battle with no rock for his sling is
patently unfair. If due process means anything, it means that
parties come into court on an equal footing. The legislature
cannot arbitrarily favor one side over the other. Limiting attorneys' fees only for plaintiffs' lawyers unconstitutionally disturbs the balance protected by the right to due process of law.
3.

Other ConstitutionalConcerns

The Minnesota State Constitution guarantees a remedy for
96. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. See also MICRA and Equal Protection, supra note 79, at 941-47.
97. The Health Education and Welfare Department found that "there does not
appear to be any gross discrepancy between the resultant rates charged by the plaintiff bar and those charged by the defense bar in medical malpractice cases." U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S

COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

33 (1973) (quoted in MICRA and Equal Protec-

tion, supra note 79, at 943).
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wrongfully inflicted injury: "Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the law for all injuries or wrongs which he may
receive in his person, property or character." 98 No section of
the constitution is superfluous; 9 9 every section is an "imperative mandate of the sovereign people."' 00 While article 1, section 8 does not prevent the legislature from abrogating a
common law right if it provides a reasonable substitute,' 0 ' it
does prevent such abrogations without a reasonable substitute
remedy. 10 2 A remedy must be afforded to those injured by
others.' 0 3 From the inception of this state, article 1, section 8
has guaranteed that:
We would never for one moment suppose that the legislature has the power.., to deprive a person, or class of persons, of the right of trial by jury, or ...their property to be
taken for public use without just compensation; and yet
neither of these is more sacred to the citizen, or more carefully guarded by the constitution, than the right to have a
certain and prompt remedy in the laws for all injuries or
10 4
wrongs to person, property, or character.
Capping damages steals from the most severely injured the
right to have a certain remedy for all of their damages. It is an
abrogation of their rights without any concomitant substitute.
It is, therefore, a violation of the Minnesota Constitution, article 1, section 8.
The Minnesota Constitution also guarantees, "[T]he right of
trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases
at law without regard to the amount in controversy."' 1 5 The
right to a jury trial is an unimpaired right as it existed by the
laws of the territory at the time the state constitution was
adopted. 0 6 Individuals, no matter how badly injured have al98. MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
99. See Butler Taconite v. Roemer, 282 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Minn. 1979).
100. Freeman v. Goff, 206 Minn. 49, 54, 287 N.W. 238, 241 (1939).
101. See Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949); Mathison
v. Minneapolis, St. P. Ry., 126 Minn. 286, 148 N.W. 71 (1914) (Workers' Compensation abrogation of common law right to sue found constitutional, for it provided the
reasonable substitute of compensation for injuries regardless of fault).
102. See Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974) (preventing
third party indemnity against employer who paid workers compensation benefits violates MINN. CONST. art. 1,§ 8).
103. See Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 600 (Minn. 1980).
104. Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 18, 7 Gil. 1, 6 (1862).
105. MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
106. See Landgrafv. Ellsworth, 267 Minn. 323, 126 N.W.2d 766 (1964).
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ways had the right to have a jury determine, unimpaired by any
limitations, the full amount of their damages and have that
amount awarded to them as a judgment. Placing caps on damages impairs the right to ajury trial. It runs afoul of the provision that a jury trial is a given right without regard to the
amount in controversy. The damage cap proposal violates the
guaranty of a right to a jury trial in all civil cases in
07
Minnesota.
CONCLUSION

The problem with tort reforms is that they do not attack the
problem. There is no crisis in the civil litigation system.
Americans are neither overly litigious as plaintiffs nor overly
generous as jurors. Thus, it is only natural that tort reforms
have had no effect on insurance rates or availability. Giving
medication to a healthy man is at best ineffective but can, as
well, make the healthy man ill. The medicine of reform, if it is
to have any effect, must be directed to the true cause of the
malady. The true cause of the crisis in insurance cost and
availability is the cyclical nature of the insurance business.
Before turning to tort reforms, many of which are of doubtful
constitutionality, the Minnesota Legislature should look to insurance reform. 108
107. Recently a federal district court declared a medical malpractice damage cap
contained in VA. CODE § 8.01-581.15 (1950) unconstitutional under article 1, section
11 of the Virginia Constitution. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 789 (W.D. Va.
1986). VA. CONST. art. I, § 11 guarantees to Virginians a right to civil trial by jury
nearly identical to that guaranteed Minnesotans by MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
108. Just what and how "insurance reform" should be accomplished is beyond the
scope of this article. A few suggestions have been offered by Robert E. Cartwright:
1) requiring the insurance industry to open its books and keep statistics and data with
reference to claims, actual payouts, verdicts, premiums and investment income;
2) tighter regulation of the industry's underwriting and pricing policies; and 3) regulation of Off Shore Reinsurers (such as Lloyd's of London) whose influence on primary carriers in the American market is great. Remarks of Robert E. Cartwright at
the ABA Midwinter Convention (Feb. 8, 1986) (reprinted in 11 MINN. TRIAL L. 13
(Summer 1986)).
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APPENDIX
MINNESOTA JURY VERDICTS 10 9
TABLE 1

HENNEPIN COUNTY
1981-1985
Year

Civil Cases Filed

Personal Injury Jury
Verdicts

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

7,321
7,426
8,183
9,778
10,140

68
41
73
156
128

TOTAL

42,848

466

TABLE 2
HENNEPIN COUNTY
PERSONAL INJURY JURY VERDICTS
1981-1985

Year

Plaintiff
Verdicts

Plaintiff
Verdicts
Settled
After Trial

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

19
8
13
34
28

18
11
17
42
29

109.
(1987).

Defense
Verdicts

Defense
Verdicts
Settled
After Trial

On Appeal/
Reduced By Court

27
20
36
65
55

4
2
6
13
11

1
2
5

MINNESOTA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, MINNESOTA JURY VERDICTS
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TABLE 3
HENNEPIN COUNTY
AVERAGE JURY VERDICTS
1981-1985
Year

Personal Injury
Jury Verdicts

Average Jury Verdicts

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

46
28
49
99
83

$17,153.86
$14,063.30
$19,049.12
$13,682.72
$16,003.57

Number and Percent ofJury
Verdicts Below Average
34
22
41
79
64

(74.0%)
(78.6%)
(83.7%)
(79.8%)
(77.1%)

TABLE 4
HENNEPIN COUNTY
AVERAGE JURY VERDICTS
(Includes cases settled after trial, on appeal, reduced by
court) 1981-1985
Year

Jury Verdicts

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

68
41
73
156
128

Average Jury Verdict

Number and Percent of Jury
Verdicts Below Average

$17,262.30
$44,659.11
$32,622.80
$24,469.47
$35,363.80

50
35
60
114
97

(73.5%)
(85.4%)
(82.2%)
(73.1%)
(75.8%)

TABLE 5
ST. LOUIS COUNTY
1981-1985
Personal Injury Jury
Year

Civil Cases Filed

Verdicts

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

1,072
1,088
930
884
835

28
24
28
40
33

TOTAL

4,809

153
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TABLE 6
ST. LOUIS COUNTY
PERSONAL INJURY JURY VERDICTS
1981-1985

Year

Plaintiff
Verdicts

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

14
10
13
21
14

TOTAL

72

Plaintiff
Verdicts
Settled
After Trial

Defense
Verdicts

On Appeal/
Reduced By Court

11
9
11
17
16

1
1
1
1
2

64

6

2
4
3
1
1
11

TABLE 7
ST. LOUIS COUNTY
AVERAGE JURY VERDICTS
1981-1985
Personal Injury

Number and Percent ofJury

Year

Jury Verdicts

Average Jury Verdicts

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

25
19
24
38
30

$34,689.79
$84,652.33
$20,021.55
$23,796.18
$ 6,218.98

Verdicts Below Average
23
18
20
29
21

(92.0%)
(94.7%)
(83.3%)
(76.3%)
(70.0%)

TABLE 8
ST. LOUIS COUNTY
AVERAGE JURY VERDICTS
1981-1985 (Includes cases settled after trial, on appeal,
reduced by courts)
Year

Personal Injury
Jury Verdicts

Average Jury Verdict

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

28
24
28
40
33

$ 48,356.96
$684,127.95
$ 62,711.33
$ 27,356.37
$ 42,062.02
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Number and Percent of Jury
Verdicts Below Average
25
21
22
31
30

(89.3%)
(87.5%)
(78.6%)
(77.5%)
(90.9%)
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TABLE 9
STEARNS COUNTY
1981-1985
Year

Personal Injury Jury
Verdicts

Civil Cases Filed

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
TOTAL

731
746
693
778
846

3
2
4
6
4

3,794

19

TABLE 10
STEARNS COUNTY
PERSONAL INJURY JURY VERDICTS

1981-1985

Year

Plaintiff
Verdicts

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

1
3
3

TOTAL

9

Plaintiff
Verdicts
Settled
After Trial

2
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Defense
Verdicts
1
2
3
2
1

0

9

Defense
Verdicts
Settled
After Trial

1
1
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TABLE 11
STEARNS COUNTY
AVERAGE JURY VERDICTS

1981-1985
Personal Injury

Number and Percent of Jury

Year

Jury Verdicts

Average Jury Verdict

Verdicts Below Average

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

3
2
4
5
4

$54,432.33
-0$ 6,250.00
$53,972.92
$ 8,194.58

2 (66.6%)
N/A
3 (75.0%)
3 (60.0%)
3 (75.0%)

TABLE 12
STEARNS COUNTY
AVERAGE JURY VERDICTS
1981-1985 (Includes cases settled after trial)
Year

Personal Injury
Jury Verdicts

Average Jury Verdict

Number and Percent of Jury
Verdicts Below Average

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

3
2
4
6
4

$54,432.33
-0$ 6,250.00
$44,977.43
$ 8,194.58

2 (66.6%)
N/A
3 (75.0%)
4 (66.6%)
3 (75.0%)

TABLE 13
CIVIL FILINGS
STATEWIDE
1981-1985
(District Court)
Year

Total Civil Filings Personal Injury Filings

Personal Injury Filings as a
% of Total Civil Filings

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

10,155
20,815
21,364
27,753
29,885

3,936
4,627
4,626
5,138
5,410

38.8%
22.2%
21.6%
18.5%
18.1%

TOTAL

109,972

23,737

21.6%
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TABLE 14
CIVIL FILINGS
HENNEPIN COUNTY
1981-1985
(District Court)
Year

Total Civil Filings Personal Injury Filings

Personal Injury Filings as a
% of Total Civil Filings

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

7,321
7,426
8,183
9,778
10,140

1,619
1,671
1,684
1,815
1,873

22.1%
22.5%
20.6%
18.6%
18.5%

TOTAL

42,848

8,662

20.2%

TABLE 15
CIVIL FILINGS
ST. LOUIS COUNTY
1981-1985
(District Court)
Year

Total Civil Filings Personal Injury Filings

Personal Injury Filings as a
% of Total Civil Filings

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

1,072
1,088
930
884
835

222
249
249
253
266

20.7%
22.9%
26.8%
28.6%
31.9%

TOTAL

4,809

1,239

25.8%

TABLE 16
CIVIL FILINGS
STEARNS COUNTY
1981-1985
(District Court)
Personal Injury Filings as a
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
TOTAL

Total Civil Filings Personal Injury Filings

%

of Total Civil Filings

731
746
693
778
846

57
74
64
81
134

7.8%
9.9%
9.2%
10.4%
15.8%

3,794

410

10.8%
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